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965 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1992),
petition for cert. filed (Oct. 14, 1992)
The retroactive application of a constitutional criminal procedure rule
is frequently an issue in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 2 9 The court's
determination of applicability hinges on whether the rule is new. 260 Justice
Harlan opined in Mackey v. United States261 that, given the nature, scope
and purpose of habeas corpus, courts should not retroactively apply new
rules in habeas cases unless one of two narrow exceptions is present. 262 In
Teague v. Lane,263 the Supreme Court, in a plurality decision, adopted
Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity of new rules in habeas corpus
proceedings. The Teague Court, while admitting the difficulty of identi-
fying a new rule, nevertheless attempted the task. 264 The Court held that
a new rule arises when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation
on the government, or if precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final would not dictate the decision of the court
announcing the rule. 265 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not
clarified this question.
266
In 1990, the Supreme Court, in Cage v. Louisiana,2 7 found that jury
instructions equating "reasonable doubt" with "substantial doubt" and
259. See Henderson v. Singletary, 968 F.2d 1070, 1073 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying Teague
v. Lane and concluding that Michigan v. Jackson should not apply retroactively in habeas
proceeding); Nickerson v. Lee, 971 F.2d 1125, 1134 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying Teague v. Lane
and finding that rule prohibiting discrimination in selection of grand jury foremen in North
Carolina constituted new rule), petition for cert. filed, October 21, 1992 (No. 92-6327); Andiarena
v. United States, 967 F.2d 715, 717-18 (Ist Cir. 1992) (holding that rule in McClesky v. Zant
was not new rule and would apply retroactively); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 409 (1990).
(holding that rule of Arizona v. Roberson was new rule that did not fall within exceptions to
bar on retroactive application); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486 (1990) (holding that rule urged
by defendant was new rule and was not entitled to retroactive application under exceptions).
260. See Butler, 494 U.S. at 409 (holding that new rule did not meet exceptions to bar on
retroactive application); Saffle, 494 U.S. at 486 (same).
261. 401 U.S. 667, 690 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
262. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgments of two of three cases considered, but disagreeing with plurality on retroactivity rules
used to reach judgment in case on collateral review).
263. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
264. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (adopting Justice Harlan's approach to
retroactive application of new rules in habeas corpus cases).
265. Id.
266. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (holding that court announces new
rule if outcome is "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds"); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S.
484, 488 (1990) (holding that court establishes new rule if state court would feel compelled by
existing precedent to conclude that Constitution requires rule).
267. 111 S. Ct. 328 (1990).
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"moral certainty" lowered the degree of proof required for conviction to
a standard below that required by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 268 In Adams v. Aiken,
26 9
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied Teague
as it decided whether the Supreme Court had announced a new rule in
Cage, barring the application of the Cage rule in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding.
A South Carolina jury had convicted the defendant, Sylvester Adams,
of murder, kidnapping, and housebreaking and sentenced him to death
for his crimes. The South Carolina Supreme Court overturned his convic-
tion in 1981 because of procedural and evidentiary errors. On remand, a
second jury convicted Adams of the same crimes and again sentenced him
to death. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld this conviction in
1983. Following denial of certiorari by both the South Carolina Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court, Adams, in 1986 filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging the presence of numerous
errors in his second trial. After an evidentiary hearing on the specific issue
of Adams's mental competence, a United States magistrate recommended
denial of the petition. The United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina adopted the magistrate's recommendation. Adams then
appealed the denial of his petition to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.
Adams raised eleven issues on appeal. Adams first argued that under
Cage a jury instruction equating "reasonable doubt" with "substantial
doubt" and "moral certainty" violated his right to due process by un-
constitutionally lowering the state's burden of proof. In response, the
Fourth Circuit found that the jury instruction given in Adams's second
trial was similar to the instruction in Cage and had the effect of diluting
the reasonable doubt standard, in violation of Adams's right to due
process. However, this finding alone did not require a new trial.
Relying on Teague v. Lane,270 the Adams court found that new rules
do not apply retroactively to cases brought on collateral review. Because
Adams's conviction was final in 1983 and Cage was decided in 1990, the
court's application of Cage would be retroactive. If Cage was a new rule,
the court could not apply it to Adams by granting him a new trial.
The Fourth Circuit first reviewed the definition of a "new rule."
Teague stated that a court announces a new rule when the court's holding
breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the lower courts. 27' In
Butler v. McKellar,272 the Supreme Court elaborated on this definition,
holding that even if the result of a case is controlled by precedent, a court
268. U.S. CONST. amend V, cl. 3; amend XIV, § 1, cl. 3; Cage v. Louisiana, II1 S. Ct.
328, 329-30 (1990).
269. 965 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, Oct. 14, 1992 (No. 92-6259).
270. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
271. Id. at 301.
272. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
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announces a new rule if the outcome is "susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds. ' 273 The Supreme Court provided another articulation
of the test for a new rule in Saffle v. Parks, stating that a court establishes
a new rule if a state court would feel compelled by existing precedent to
conclude that the Constitution required the rule.274
Adams argued that the Cage rule was not a new rule, but merely an
application of the principle announced in In re Winship275 that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime for which he is
charged. 276 However, the Fourth Circuit found that cases dealing with
reasonable doubt instructions, subsequent to Winship and prior to Cage,
had only criticized the jury instructions using "substantial certainty" and
"moral certainty," -without reversing convictions on the basis of those
instructions. 277 The Fourth Circuit concluded that Cage, which reversed a
conviction based on a jury instruction diluting the reasonable doubt
standard, announced a new rule. Consequently, the court held it could
not retroactively apply the new rule of Cage to Adams, unless it found
that either of two exceptions to the Teague standard was present.
The first exception applies to new rules that place an entire category
of behavior beyond the reach of criminal law or that prohibit imposition
of certain types of punishment for a class of defendants based upon their
offense or status.278 The Fourth Circuit found this exception inapplicable
because the Cage rule did neither. The second exception applies to a new
rule that requires the observance of procedures that are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." 279 This exception is limited to rules without
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is diminished. 20 The new
rule must both improve the accuracy of a trial and alter the understanding
of the "bedrock procedural elements" that are essential to a fair trial.
281
The court found that while Cage did eliminate confusion and improve the
accuracy of a trial, it did not alter the essential elements of a fair trial or
the court's understanding of them. Finding the circumstances of the case
satisfied neither exception, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it should not
273. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990).
274. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990).
275. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
276. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
277. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488 (1978) (remarking that jury instruction
equating reasonable doubt with substantial doubt is not itself reversible error); United States v.
Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333-34 (4th Cir. 1985) (same); Smith v. Bordenkircher, 718 F.2d 1273,
1277-78 (4th Cir. 1983) (refusing to reverse conviction on basis of jury instruction clarifying
reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 976 (1984).
278. See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990) (holding that Caldwell v. Mississippi
announced new rule and did not come within exceptions to bar on retroactive application to
habeas cases).
279. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
280. Id. at 313.
281. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).
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retroactively apply the rule announced in Cage. In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the court noted that its holding was consistent with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Skelton v. Whitley.
28 2
The Fourth Circuit also found that Adams' other claims raised on
appeal were not meritorious. For example, Adams contended that the
prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Mary-
land.2 3 For a Brady violation to occur the information withheld must be
both exculpatory and material, which the United States Supreme Court
defined as reasonably likely to affect the outcome of the trial.2 4 The
Adams court concurred in the district court's finding that the statements
in question, because of their inconsistencies, were neither exculpatory nor
material.
Adams also argued that the trial court should have excluded his
confession to the police because the police obtained it in violation of his
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The court, noting that the Supreme
Court has established safeguards to protect the constitutional rights of the
accused, found that the defendant had given his confession to police only
after consultation with his counsel. The fact that the police had improperly
obtained incriminating statements at an earlier time did not require sup-
pression of a later, validly obtained confession. 215
The Fourth Circuit's holding that the jury instruction rule announced
in Cage is new and cannot be applied retroactively in a habeas corpus
proceeding is in accord with the Fifth Circuit, the only other circuit to
consider the Cage rule. 28 At first glance, the court's decision in Adams
seems to produce a harsh result. It upholds the death penalty for a
conviction based on a constitutionally defective jury instruction. However,
policy considerations in support of this decision are strong. As Justice
Harlan pointed out in his separate opinion in Mackey, both the criminal
defendant and society have an interest in insuring with certainty that there
will be an end to a criminal prosecution. 2 7 Without finality, criminal law
is deprived of its deterrent effect. 2s8 Allowing retroactive application of
new rules to habeas corpus proceedings stymies these policy goals. Fur-
thermore, when state courts have relied in good faith on constitutional
282. 950 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 102 (1992).
283. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
284. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that nondisclosure of
impeachment evidence is constitutional error requiring reversal of conviction only if evidence is
material in that it might have affected outcome of trial).
285. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985) (holding that Fifth Amendment protection
against self incrimination does not require suppression of confession obtained after proper
Miranda warning and waiver of rights, solely because police obtained earlier unwarned confession).
286. Skelton v. Whitley, 950 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 102 (1992)
(holding that Supreme Court decision that reasonable doubt jury instruction was unconstitutional
was new rule that did not apply retroactively on collateral review).
287. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
288. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).
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precedents, federal habeas corpus should not be used to reverse their
decisions, even when their judgments are contrary to a subsequent Supreme
Court decision. 2 9 Retroactive application of new rules would dampen the
decision-making of the lower courts.
The Adams court found that Cage diluted the burden of proof, but
did not change it.290 However, in Cage the court found that the faulty
jury instructions had lowered the burden of proof for the defendant. 29 1 In
barring convictions based on the lower standard of proof, the Cage court
arguably changed the existing understanding of reasonable doubt. This
change appears to meet Justice Harlan's second exception in Mackey, by
altering the understanding of such an important "bedrock procedural
element" of every criminal trial.
292
Adams has filed a petition for certiorari from the Supreme Court. 293
However, the Supreme Court has denied the petition for certiorari filed by
the defendants in Skelton v. Whitley, where the Fifth Circuit had interpreted
the Cage rule similarly to the Fourth Circuit.29 Thus, it is unlikely that
Adams v. Aiken will receive Supreme Court review. Absent the granting of
Adams's petition, no additional guidance on the definition of new rules will
be forthcoming from the Court, and Cage will stand as a mere clarification
of the Constitutional right to due process in criminal cases.
United States v. Kincaid
964 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1992)
Section 6A1.3 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 295 requires
sentencing courts to provide both the prosecution and the defense with an
adequate opportunity to present relevant information when any factor
important to the sentencing determination is "reasonably in dispute." In
pre-guidelines practice, informal proceedings often sufficed to resolve dis-
puted sentencing factors.296 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, however, res-
olution of disputed sentencing factors could affect criminal history
categorization and offense level determination significantly. Therefore, to
ensure that the sentencing process is fair and accurate, sentencing courts
must adopt more formal procedures, in accordance with Rule 32(a)(1) of
289. Skelton, 950 F.2d at 1044.
290. Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306, 1311 (4th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, Oct. 14,
1992 (No. 92-6259).
291. Cage v. Louisiana, III S. Ct. 328, 329 (1990).
292. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1970).
293. Adams, 965 F.2d at 1306.
294. Skelton v. Whitley, 950 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 102 (1992).
295. 18 U.S.C. app. 4 (Supp. 1992) [hereinafter Sentencing Guidelines].
296. See Sentencing Guidelines § 6AI.3 (1992). The Sentencing Guidelines Commentary
points out that in preguidelines practice particular offense or offender characteristics rarely had
highly specific or required sentencing consequences. Therefore, informal proceedings were suffi-
cient to handle issues regarding relevant sentencing factors. Id.
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2 7 which allow both parties an
adequate opportunity to present relevant information regarding the disputed
factors. 29 Prior to May 7, 1992, however, no federal circuit court of appeals
had granted a prosecutor's request to be heard on a sentencing factor in
dispute.
In United States v. Kincaid (Kincaid I1),299 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a sentencing court abused
its discretion by not granting the government's request for continuance at
a resentencing hearing when the defendant made surprise objections to the
presentence investigation report. Additionally, in Kincaid II, the Fourth
Circuit considered the defendant's claim that the sentencing court violated
the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
The defendant, William F. Kincaid, Jr., argued that by applying the sentence
enhancement provisions of 18 U.S.C. section 314730 and Sentencing Guide-
lines section 2J1.7301 to his second sentence, the sentencing court acted
vindictively because the sentencing court had declined to apply those pro-
visions to Kincaid's first sentence. The Fourth Circuit also addressed the
defendant's claim that the government failed to provide adequate notice of
the existence of the enhancement provisions.30 2 Finally, the Fourth Circuit
considered the defendant's claim that the district court improperly applied
a two-level enhancement based on the defendant's aggravating role in the
offense.
297. FED. R. Canm. P. 32(a)(1).
298. See Sentencing Guidelines § 6A1.3. The Commentary explains that the exact procedure
used in resolving the disputes should be determined by the sentencing court based on the nature
of the dispute. The Commentary insists, therefore, that lengthy sentencing hearing will rarely be
necessary because under some circumstances written statements by counsel, such as affidavits of
witnesses or transcripts of previous testimony may be sufficient to resolve the disputes. Id.; see
also United States v. Upshaw, 918 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that sentencing court
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow defendant to testify at sentencing hearing when
court permitted written submissions to address issue in dispute), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1335
(1991); United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1566 (10th Cir.) (determining that trial court
need not grant evidentiary hearing when court permitted defendant to raise points at sentencing
hearing and disputes were legal rather than factual in nature), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 88 (1990);
United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 367 (Ist Cir. 1989) (ruling that district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying evidentiary hearing regarding important sentencing factor where
defendant's version of facts was implausible based on prior admissions and other evidence).
299. 964 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1992).
300. 18 U.S.C.A. 3147 (West Supp. 1992). Section 3147 provides in pertinent part that, "[a]
person convicted of an offense committed while on release pursuant to this chapter shall be
sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense to-(I) a term of imprisonment
of not less than two years and not more than ten years if the offense is a felony ... "
301. Sentencing Guidelines § 2J1.7. Section 2JI.7 provides that, "[ilf an enhancement under
18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies, add three levels to the offense level for the offense committed while
on release as if this section were a specific offense characteristic contained in the offense guideline
for the offense committed while on release.
302. See United States v. Cooper, 827 F.2d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3147 does not apply if judicial officer authorizing release failed to give defendant written notice
of release conditions and penalties for violating conditions).
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In Kincaid II, the Fourth Circuit addressed the second set of appeals
arising from Kincaid's conviction on narcotics and firearms charges. Ini-
tially, a magistrate judge arraigned Kincaid on a bank fraud charge in
October 1988. Kincaid pled guilty to that charge and, while on release
pending sentencing, committed the narcotics and firearm offenses. Prior to
the trial regarding the narcotics and firearms charges, the government filed
notice that in the event of a conviction, it would seek an enhanced sentence
under 18 U.S.C. section 3147 and Sentencing Guidelines section 2J1.7.
Following Kincaid's conviction, the district court imposed a sentence of
188 months imprisonment for the narcotics violations and a consecutive
sentence of sixty months for the firearm offense. The district court, in
computing Kincaid's first sentence, erroneously added two points to his
criminal history category pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines section 4AL.1(d).
Section 4A1.1(d) applies when a defendant commits a crime while under a
criminal justice sentence. The district court declined, however, to apply
U.S.C. section 3147 and Sentencing Guidelines section 2J1.7 because Kin-
caid's sentence was "sufficiently severe."
Kincaid subsequently appealed his 248 month sentence to the Fourth
Circuit, claiming that the district court erred by applying Sentencing Guide-
lines section 4Al.1(d). In Kincaid's first appeal, United States v. Kincaid
(Kincaid 1),303 the Fourth Circuit rejected the government's challenge to the
two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and ruled that the
district court erred by applying Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.L(d). In
Kincaid I, the Fourth Circuit noted that the district court erroneously
determined that Kincaid committed the narcotics and firearms offenses while
under a judicial sentence for the bank fraud conviction when, in fact,
Kincaid was still awaiting sentencing.. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit re-
manded Kincaid's case for resentencing on the narcotics and firearms
convictions, instructing the district court not to apply Sentencing Guidelines
section 4Al.l(d).
Prior to the resentencing hearirg, Kincaid objected to the portions of
the presentence investigation report regarding the amount of cocaine he
allegedly possessed. The government subsequently requested a continuance
to respond to Kincaid's surprise objections by calling witnesses and offering
evidence. The district court denied the government's request, and subse-
quently determined that Kincaid's base offense level was twenty-eight. The
district court then applied a two-level enhancement for Kincaid's role in the
offense pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines section 3B1.1(c), and a two-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility under Sentencing Guidelines sec-
tion 3E1.l(a). Finally, the district court applied 18 U.S.C. section 3147 and
Sentencing Guidelines section 2J1.7, which resulted in a three-level increase
to the base offense level. The court then sentenced Kincaid to 121 months
on the narcotics conviction and a consecutive sixty month sentence on the
firearm violation.
303. 912 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
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In Kincaid 17, the Fourth Circuit first concluded that Kincaid failed to
demonstrate any judicial vindictiveness regarding the second sentence. The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, determined that the district court did not violate
Kincaid's due process rights. The Fourth Circuit then found that the
application of the enhancement provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines in
the second sentence did not violate Kincaid's right against double jeopardy.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Kincaid's claim that the government did
not provide adequate notice of the existence and effect of the enhancement
provisions. The court further ruled that the district court properly applied
the two-level enhancement in Kincaid's sentence for his role as an organizer
in the offenses.
After ruling on Kincaid's claims, the Fourth Circuit then turned to the
government's appeal. The government claimed that the district court erred
by refusing to grant the requested continuance after Kincaid objected to his
presentence investigation report. The government argued that under Sen-
tencing Guidelines section 6A1.3 and Rule 32(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the court must provide both parties an opportunity to
present relevant information when a reasonable dispute arises concerning
any factor important to the sentencing determination.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the government's argument and held
that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant the continu-
ance. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, by entertaining Kincaid's surprise
objections to the presentence investigation report, the district court effec-
tively provided Kincaid with an opportunity to be heard on the issue.
Moreover, by raising objections to the content of the presentence investi-
gation report, Kincaid brought those issues into dispute. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the district court, therefore, denied the government its
opportunity to present relevant evidence regarding the amount of cocaine
attributable to Kincaid. On remand, the district could must resolve the
disputed facts by permitting both Kincaid and the government an oppor-
tunity to present evidence to support their positions.
In Kincaid II, the Fourth Circuit determined that Kincaid did not suffer
an abuse of his due process and double jeopardy rights, and that the
magistrate provided him with adequate notice of the enhancement provi-
sions. The Fourth Circuit also decided that the district court properly applied
a two-level enhancement to Kincaid's sentence for his role in the offenses.
The Fourth Circuit took issue, however, with the district court's refusal
to grant the government's request for a continuance. By remanding the case
to the district court, the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit court to
grant the government's request to be heard on sentencing factors pursuant
to section 6A1.3 and Rule 32(a)(1). Prior to Kincaid II, only the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Yellow
Earrings,04 had considered the government's request to present evidence on
a relevant sentencing factor. The Eight Circuit, however, denied the
304. 891 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1989).
CASE COMMENTS
government's request because the sentencing court had already provided
the government with an opportunity to be heard, and the government
chose not to call witnesses or present evidence at the sentencing hearing.
0 5
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Kincaid II makes clear that the
provisions of section 6A1.3 and Rule 32(a)(1) are applicable for both the
prosecution and the defense. Before Kincaid II, only defendants appealing
their sentencing procedures had availed themselves under Sentencing Guide-
lines section 6A1.3. Now, after Kincaid II, if a sentencing court entertains
the defendant's objections to the presentence report, the sentencing court
must permit the government to respond by adopting procedures appropriate
to resolve the dispute.
United States v. Lambey
974 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
a court may permit, for any fair and just reason, the withdrawal of a
guilty or no contest plea before sentencing.3°6 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has struggled to determine whether Rule
32(d) requires a showing of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
when a defendant bases his motion to withdraw his plea on' the conduct
of his counsel. 07 In 1989, a three-judge panel for the Fourth Circuit in
United States v. DeFreitas0 determined the criteria to establish a fair and
just reason to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea. The court held in
DeFreitas that the defendant must demonstrate that his attorney's per-
formance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, had
305. United States v. Yellow Earrings, 891 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1989).
306. FED. R. CRam. P. 32(d). Rule 32(d) provides in pertinent part that, "[i]f a motion for
withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is imposed, the court
may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.
307. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985) (establishing that in challenges to guilty
pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show counsel's assistance fell
below objective standard of reasonableness and there was reasonable likelihood that, but for
counsel's errors, defendant would not have pled guilty). In Hill, the Supreme Court considered
what degree of proof was necessary for a defendant to establish ineffective assistance of counsel
when attempting to withdraw a guilty plea. Id. at 56-57. In Hill, the defendant pled guilty to
first degree murder and theft in an Arkansas trial court. Id. at 53. Two years later the defendant
sought federal habeas corpus relief. Id. The defendant contended that his plea was involuntary
because his attorney misinformed him about his parole eligibility date. Id. at 54-55. The Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's arguments and determined that when a defendant brings a Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show both that the
attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a
reasonable probability that had the attorney not erred, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. 1d. at 57.
308. 865 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1989). Judges Widener, Murnaghan and Wilkins presided in
DeFreitas. Id. at 80.
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the attorney not erred, there was a reasonable probability that the defen-
dant would not have pled guilty.30 9
Two years later, in United States v. Moore,31 0 a different three-judge
panel"' adopted the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation that Rule 32(d) establishes a less stringent standard
distinctly independent of the Sixth Amendment's objective standard of
reasonableness test.312 Later in 1991, another three-judge panel in United
States v. Lambey (Lambey 1),a13 reaffirmed the DeFreitas standard. Against
this background, the Fourth Circuit en banc vacated the panel opinion in
Lambey I and agreed to rehear the case en banc in United States v.
Lambey (Lambey II).
14
In Lambey II, the Fourth Circuit reconsidered whether Rule 32(d)
creates its own less stringent standard for withdrawal of pleas or whether
the Sixth Amendment's objective standard of reasonableness is the correct
measure for any fair and just reason to permit withdrawal. The Fourth
Circuit in Lambey 11 also considered the defendant's claim that the district
court failed to inform him that under Rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure that he could not withdraw his plea. Additionally,
the Fourth Circuit, on its own invitation, heard the defendant's argument
that the district court erred by misapplying the Sentencing Guidelines.
The defendant, Dean A. Lambey, based his appeal on facts arising
after his arrest in August 1989, following a prolonged investigation to
uncover child pornographers. Lambey's counsel subsequently advised Lam-
bey that his case probably would fall into the Sentencing Guidelines
category providing for a sentence ranging from 70 to 108 months. Lam-
bey's attorney, however, advised Lambey that he could not accurately
predict the actual sentence Lambey ultimately would receive. Lambey,
upon the advice of his counsel, pled guilty to a two-count information
charging him in Count I with conspiracy to kidnap a minor and in Count
II with using an interstate computer facility to publish notices and adver-
tisements to produce child pornography and to engage in sexually explicit
309. United States v. DeFreitas, 865 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that "any fair and
just reason" to permit plea withdrawal meant that defendant maintained same burden as if
defendant asserted Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance by counsel as articulated in
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)).
310. 931 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1991).
311. United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991).
Judges Russell, Phillips, and Murnaghan presided in Moore. Id. at 247.
312. Id. at 248. In Moore, the Fourth Circuit panel declared that under Rule 32(d) the
court should consider factors including: (1) whether the defendant offered credible evidence that
his plea was not knowing or not voluntary; (2) whether the defendant credibly asserted his
innocence; (3) whether the defendant delayed significantly in the time between entering the plea
and entering the motion to withdraw the plea; (4) whether the defendant has had close assistance
of competent counsel; (5) whether withdrawal will prejudice the government; and (6) whether
withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources. Id.
313. 949 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1991). Judges Widener, Wilkins and Niemeyer presided in
Lambey I. Id. at 135.
314. 974 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1992).
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conduct with minors. Lambey's plea agreement expressly stated that any
sentencing estimate his counsel, the probation officer, or the prosecution
quoted to him would not be binding on the court.
Following Lambey's guilty plea, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia conducted a hearing pursuant to Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. At the Rule 11 hearing,
Lambey testified that he fully understood the terms of the agreement and
that the agreement constituted his entire understanding with the govern-
ment. The district court then reiterated to Lambey that under the guidelines
no one could accurately predict the sentence until after the court examined
the presentence report 'and then imposed the sentence.
After the Rule 11 hearing, the probation officer tentatively calculated
Lambey's possible sentence pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines and
advised Lambey that a large discrepancy existed between the sentence
Lambey expected and the sentence he had calculated. Lambey promptly
wrote a letter to the district court requesting to file a motion to withdraw
his plea. Lambey's counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the
plea. Lambey then retained new counsel to argue the motion to withdraw
the plea. The district court, following an evidentiary hearing, denied
Lambey's motion and then sentenced Lambey to 360 months imprisonment
on Count I and a concurrent 120 months on Count II.
Lambey then appealed the district court's refusal to grant his motion
to withdraw his plea. On appeal in Lambey I, Lambey claimed that his
first counsel's erroneous estimate of his potential sentence constituted a
fair and just reason for the plea withdrawal. Lambey also contended that
the district court failed to advise him, pursuant to Rule 11 (e)(2), that he
could not withdraw his plea. The three-judge panel in Lambey I, however,
rejected both arguments and affirmed the district court's ruling.
Lambey filed a motion for rehearing and the Fourth Circuit en banc
agreed to rehear Lambey's arguments. In Lambey II, Lambey presented
the same two arguments he did in Lambey L In Lambey II, Lambey also
argued, upon invitation of the court, that the district court erred by
misapplying the Sentencing Guidelines. Lambey argued that, applied prop-
erly, the Sentencing Guidelines would require a sentencing range on Count
I from 63-78 months and 41-51 months on Count II.
In a seven to six decision, the Fourth Circuit in Lambey II, rejected
Lambey's arguments and affirmed the district court's decision and sen-
tence. The Fourth Circuit rejected Lambey's contention that the district
court failed to advise him that he could not withdraw his plea pursuant
to the requirements of the Rule 11(e)(2). The Fourth Circuit noted that
Lambey's plea agreement was not the type of plea arrangement to which
Rule 11(e)(2) applied. Therefore, the district court did not need to advise
Lambey he could withdraw his plea. Additionally, by affirming the district
court's sentence without explanation, the majority determined that the
district court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines.
The majority also accepted the objective standard of reasonableness
test and the requirement that the defendant prove that but for his counsel's
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error he would have gone to trial. The Fourth Circuit began its analysis
of the Rule 32(d) issue by stipulating that the decision to permit the plea
withdrawal fell within the purview of the district court's discretion and,
therefore, the Fourth Circuit could review the district court's decision only
under the abuse of discretion standard. The majority then declared that
if the court warns the defendant of the consequences of the guilty plea
and the defendant acknowledges that he understands those consequences,
then the defendant will bear a heavy burden in attempting to show a fair
and just reason to permit the withdrawal.
In its analysis, the majority noted that Lambey's main contention,
that his first counsel erred significantly when estimating possible sentencing
ranges, raised the question of Lambey's counsel's competence. Because
the question rested on the competence of counsel, the Fourth Circuit
quoted from the Supreme Court's decision in Hill v. Lockhart which
required a showing that the attorney's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and thereby prejudiced the defendant. The
court then applied the objective reasonableness standard to Lambey's case
and concluded that because of the complexities of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, the attorney's sentencing range estimate did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Moreover, the majority noted that
Lambey testified that his counsel warned him not to rely on the estimates.
The Fourth Circuit majority, therefore, determined that Lambey's attorney
did not perform unreasonably.
Four judges filed separate dissents in which two other judges joined.
Judge Widener filed a dissent in which Judge Sprouse joined. -Widener's
dissent contended that the Fourth Circuit should overrule DeFreitas in
favor of the rule enunciated in United States v. Moore. According to
Judge Widener, under the lower Rule 32(d) standard, Lambey had stated
a fair and just reason to permit withdrawal. Similarly, Judge Phillips filed
a separate dissent in which Chief Judge Ervin joined. Phillips also con-
tended that the Fourth Circuit's decision in DeFreitas was incorrect and
that the proper standard would be Rule 32(d)'s fair and just standard.
Judge Murnaghan dissented on the ground that the district court
imposed the wrong sentence. According to Judge Murnaghan, because
there were ambiguities in the Sentencing Guidelines, the court should
resolve the ambiguities by resorting to the rule of lenity. Murnaghan
contended that the sentencing court created a miscarriage of justice by
adopting the guideline for accomplished first degree murder. At issue,
according to Murnaghan, was whether the sentencing court should adopt
the guideline for accomplished first degree murder when the defendant
only conspired to kidnap and murder a minor. Murnaghan argued that
under the guidelines, the sentencing court should have sentenced Lambey
for the accomplished offense of kidnapping, not for accomplished first
degree murder because the rule of lenity required such a result. Judge
Hall filed a separate dissent acknowledging his agreement with Judge
Murnaghan's analysis and contending that, because of the ambiguities in
the Sentencing Guidelines and wide discrepancy in the sentencing ranges,
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Lambey established a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Lambey H creates a split with other
circuits that have interpreted Rule 32(d) as creating a less stringent fair
and just reasons standard. For example, the Second Circuit in United
States v. Sweeney, 315 and the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Bennett,
16
both determined that Rule 32(d) requires only a showing of a fair and
just reason for plea withdrawal and not the more stringent ineffective
assistance of counsel standard. Moreover, even within the Fourth Circuit,
the decision in Lambey II creates a split among the judges. At least four
of the judges who presided at the rehearing in Lambey H would have
adopted the less demanding fair and just standard and would have over-
ruled DeFreitas.
317
The issue of whether Rule 32(d) creates a separate less stringent
standard than the constitutionally defective assistance of counsel standard
is controversial. As indicated by the dissents in Lambey II, the issue
probably will remain controversial within the Fourth Circuit until the
Supreme Court determines which standard Rule 32(d) requires. Until the
Supreme Court rules, however, defendants in the Fourth Circuit wishing
to withdraw their guilty or no contest pleas based on their counsels'
performance will face a stringent standard of proof that their attorneys'
conduct prejudiced them and fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness.
Poyner v. Murray
964 F.2d 1404 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 419,(1992)
In Miranda v. Arizona 18 the United States Supreme Court held that
prosecutors could not use statements made during custodial interrogation
at trial unless the defendants were advised of certain constitutional rights,
in particular the right to counsel, prior to questioning. Once the police
advise a defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant then knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waives them, the police may question the
defendant without providing counsel. 319 The Supreme Court, in Edwards
v. Arizona, held that if a suspect explicitly requests an attorney during
questioning all interrogation must cease. 320 If the suspect then actively
315. 878 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1989).
316. 716 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1990).
317. United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1992). In Lambey II, Judge Sprouse
joined in Judge Widener's dissent and Chief Judge Ervin joined in Judge Phillips dissent. In
both of those dissents, the judges argued that Rule 32(d) requires a less stringent standard than
the constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel standard. Id. at 1402-08.
318. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
319. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (holding that police may interrogate
suspect without providing attorney if suspect does not ask for one).
320. See 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding inadmissible statements obtained after suspect's request
for attorney during interrogation).
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initiates further discussion, any postrequest statements made by the suspect
may be admissible.3 2' However, the Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of whether a defendant who mentions the right to counsel, but does
not clearly and affirmatively invoke that right, has in fact invoked the
right to counsel.
322
In Poyner v. Murray323 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered whether a defendant's statement, "Didn't you
say that I have a right to an attorney?" during questioning constituted a
request for counsel that prevented the police from further interrogation
of the defendant. The court also considered the petitioner's contentions
that his counsel was ineffective so as to deny him his right to counsel
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, that Virginia's system of
appointing counsel for indigent defendants violated due process, and that
the district court should have granted him evidentiary hearings on his
Miranda and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
The petitioner, Syvasky Lafayette Poyner, was convicted and sentenced
to death in three separate trials for the murder of five women over the
space of eleven days. When arrested, the police took him into custody
and advised him of his Miranda rights before he made any statements.
Poyner indicated that he understood his rights. The police took Poyner
before a magistrate who advised him of the charges against him and
determined that Poyner be held without bond. Two detectives then took
Poyner into a room for interrogation. The detectives again advised Poyner
of his Miranda rights and he reindicated that he understood those rights.
When the detectives informed Poyner of some of the evidence against
him, he responded by saying, "Didn't you tell me that I have the right
to an attorney?" One detective replied, "Yes, you do, that is correct,"
and both detectives stood up to leave believing the defendant had invoked
his right to counsel. As the detectives stood, Poyner said, "Let me tell
you about the car." The detectives then returned to their seats, and Poyner
made incriminating statements concerning the car of one of the murder
victims. A detective, referring to the victim, then asked Poyner, "Did you
kill her?" and Poyner responded by confessing in detail to her murder.
Later that same day Poyner confessed to the murders of the other four
women and discussed the crimes in great detail. After further questioning,
Poyner read and signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and confessed
again on videotape. The prosecution used this videotape at trial, over
Poyner's objections, in both the guilt and sentencing phases of his three
trials.
321. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (finding that statements made
after request for counsel are admissible if suspect initiates further communication).
322. But see Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 1058 (1985) (holding that court must give
suspect's statement its ordinary meaning, and not interpret it as request for counsel, unless
statement is ambiguous).
323. 964 F.2d 1404 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 419 (1992).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed all five convictions, and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Poyner collaterally ap-
pealed these convictions in the Virginia state courts, but was denied
appellate relief. Thereafter, Poyner sought relief in the federal courts
through a writ of habeas corpus. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia dismissed all of Poyner's claims. With regard
to Poyner's Miranda claim, the court held that Poyner's remarks were
only a request for an explanation of his rights and not an invocation. of
his right to counsel. Therefore, according to the federal district court, the
state trial judge properly admitted the confessions at trial. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit dismissed Poyner's inadequate assistance claim and his
claims for evidentiary hearings. The court also refused to consider the
constitutional claim regarding appointment of counsel becauise Poyner had
not raised the issue at any of his trials.
To resolve the Miranda issue, the Poyner court noted that because
Poyner did not dispute that the detectives read him his Miranda rights or
that he indicated his understanding of them, the only issue was whether
Poyner's later remark was an invocation of his right to counsel. The court
adopted the holding of United States v. J.ardina 24 where the United States
Court of.Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant's mere use
of the word attorney is not necessarily an invocation of the right to
counsel. 325 The Poyner court found that Poyner's remark was not a request
for counsel under Jardina because Poyner's question to the detectives
suggested even less of an immediate desire to speak with counsel than the
statement in Jardina.
Poyner argued that even if his statement was ambiguous, and therefore
not an invocation of the right to counsel under Jardina, because both
detectives believed he was requesting counsel the court should legally
construe his question as an invocation of the right. The Poyner court
found no basis for such a rule and applied Moran v. Burbine326 which
held that, in the similar context of waiver of Miranda rights, the state of
mind of the police is irrelevant. The court also expressed reluctance to
adopt a rule that would penalize detectives for being too careful about
complying with a suspect's constitutional rights during questioning. The
detectives interrogating Poyner had shown admirable respect for Poyner's
right to counsel, and the court refused to allow Poyner to use the
detective's caution as evidence of an invocation of his own constitutional
rights.
Finding no invocation of Poyner's right to counsel from his remark,
the Poyner court next looked at the events following the remark to
324. 747 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1984).
325. United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 949 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant's
remark that he was interested in type of plea bargain he could arrange between government and
his counsel was not invocation of his right to counsel), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 (1985).
326. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
19931
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:243
determine if Poyner's actions suggested an invocation of the right to
counsel. After the detectives moved to leave the room, Poyner offered the
information about the car apparently to keep them in the room. The court
reasoned that this action was contradictory to a desire to postpone further
questioning until an attorney arrived. Poyner invoked Smith v. Illinois
where the Supreme Court held that the prosecution could not use words
or actions following a request for counsel to cast doubt on that request. 27
The Poyner court, however, distinguished Smith because that case dealt
with a clear, unambiguous request for counsel, whereas the case sub judice
did not involve a request for counsel at all. Smith only protects a suspect
from the police coercing him into withdrawing a request for counsel.
Therefore, the Poyner court found Smith inapplicable where the defendant
requests a clarification of his right to counsel and then offers an unsolicited
incriminating statement.
Even assuming Poyner's remarks and actions evidenced an invocation
of his right to counsel, the court found that his subsequent comment
about the car was a reinitiation of the interrogation and a waiver of
Miranda rights under Edwards v. Arizona. In Edwards the Supreme Court
held that if a defendant initiates further dialogue after requesting counsel
during custodial interrogation, his statements and responses to subsequent
police questioning are admissible provided they pass a two-prong test. 328
To satisfy the first prong, a court must find that the suspect reinitiated
the interrogation. Accordingly, the Poyner court determined that Poyner's
statement about the car was a reinitiation of interrogation because it
evidenced a desire to continue the interrogation by preventing the detectives
from leaving the room and because he made the statement without solic-
itation by the detectives.
To satisfy the second prong, a court must find that the suspect
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived the right to counsel,
looking at the totality of the circumstances. Applying the second prong,
the Poyner court found ample indication that Poyner did voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waive his rights. There was no sign of police
misconduct intimidating Poyner into talking further, so the court found
the waiver to be voluntary.
In analyzing whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently gave
the waiver, the court looked to the suspect's intelligence, education,
criminal record, and the time frame between the Miranda warnings and
the waiver. Analyzing the relevant factors, the Poyner court noted that
Poyner was of near average intelligence, had completed eighth grade, was
literate, and, apart from his criminal behavior, was able to function and
support himself in society. Poyner also had an extensive criminal record,
so he was very familiar with police and judicial process. Poyner's actions
327. See 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (holding that suspect's response to interrogation following
unambiguous request for counsel cannot be used to question clarity of that request for counsel).
328. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981).
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after his remark were also convincing evidence of a knowing and intelligent
waiver. The detectives advised Poyner of his Miranda rights, he indicated
that he understood them, and then, after the detectives presented him with
some of the evidence against him, Poyner asked for clarification about
his right to counsel. After the detectives told him that he did in fact have
that right, and after seeing the detectives obvious willingness to cease
interrogation, the Poyner court felt it would be absurd to argue that when
Poyner continued to volunteer information he was not knowingly'and
intelligently waiving his right to counsel. Accordingly, the court found
Poyner's statements were admissible at trial under the Edwards two-prong
test.
Finding that Poyner's statements were clearly admissible, the Fourth
Circuit dismissed Poyner's petitions and upheld the findings of the federal
district court and the Virginia Supreme Court. The Fourth Circuit's holding
that a invocation of the right to counsel must be more than just a reference
to that right, or to an attorney, is in agreement with all other federal
courts of appeal that have addressed the issue.3 29
United States v. Moss
963 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1992)
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.330
The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Fourth Amend-
ment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's home, includ-
ing entry to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.33' Such
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment-subject only to few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.332 The exclusionary rule prohibits evidence seized in violation
329. See Norman v. Ducharme, 871 F.2d 1483, 1486 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant's
question to police officer as to whether he should get attorney was not invocation of right to
counsel), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1031 (1990); United States v. Eirin, 778 F.2d 722, 728 (lth Cir.
1985) (holding that refusal to sign waiver of right to counsel without attorney's guidance was
not affirmative request for counsel); Jardina, 747 F.2d at 949 (holding that defendant's remark
that he was interested in type of plea bargain he could arrange between government and his
counsel was not invocation of his right to counsel).
330. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
331. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1990) (citing Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)).
332. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971) (holding that warrantless search of suspect's premises per se unreasonable
unless within one of carefully defined set of exceptions).
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of the Fourth Amendment from being introduced against a criminal
defendant at trial.
333
One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent
circumstances exception. The exigent circumstances exception provides that
a warrantless search is not always unreasonable for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment if certain circumstances exist, such as hot pursuit, risk
of evidence destruction, and threat of bodily harm or death.
334
Another exception to the exclusionary rule is the good-faith exception,
which the Supreme Court has developed in recent cases. In United States
v. Leon,3 s the Supreme Court established the good-faith exception and
applied it to keep evidence from being suppressed when law enforcement
officers obtained evidence through objective good-faith reliance on a
facially valid warrant that was later found to lack probable cause. 336 Later,
in Illinois v. Krull,337 the Supreme Court extended the good-faith exception
to searches conducted in good faith reliance on a statute later declared to
be unconstitutional. 3 8 Prior to 1990, some circuit courts limited Leon and
Krull to their facts by declining to extend the good-faith exception to
searches which were not conducted in reliance on either a warrant or a
statute. 339 However, in 1990, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Rodriguez,340 further extended the good-faith exception to a warrantless
search conducted on the basis of an officer's mistaken, but good-faith
belief that a consenter to a search had authority to allow it.14 1 Against
this backdrop, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in United States v. Moss, 342 considered how to apply both the good-faith
exception and the exigent circumstances exception to the exclusionary rule.
In Moss, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered whether marijuana obtained during a warrantless search of
333. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2799. Only if the defendant consents to illegally seized evidence
will the evidence be admitted at trial. Id.
334. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 6.1(f), 6.5(b), 6.5(d) (2d ed. 1987)
(discussing exigent circumstances, risk of evidence destruction, and threat of bodily harm or
death respectively).
335. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
336. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (summarizing results of opinion
that evaluated costs and benefits of suppressing evidence in question).
337. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
338. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987) (holding that Leon good-faith exception
to exclusionary rule was also applicable to evidence obtained by officer acting in objectively
reasonable reliance on statute).
339. See United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569, 1579 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply
Leon good-faith exception to search of each room in hotel while in hot pursuit of bank robber);
United States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply good-faith
exception to search conducted in reliance on regulations later determined not to authorize search
at issue).
340. 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
341. See United States v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2798-2801 (1990) (holding that
warrantless entry is valid when based upon consent of third party whom police, at time of entry,
reasonable believe to possess common authority over premises, but who in fact does not).
342. 963 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1992).
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defendant's cabin should be suppressed as evidence under the exclusionary
rule when an officer conducted the search under the mistaken belief that
the defendant's occupation of the cabin was unauthorized. In reaching its
conclusion that the search was unconstitutional and that the evidence
should have been suppressed, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the good-faith
doctrine and the emergency doctrine, finding that neither applied to the
facts at bar.
In Moss, the defendant Bryan Moss, along with his friend Christopher
Monroe, reserved, registered, and legally occupied a cabin in the Nantahala
National Forest during a hiking and fishing trip. Forest Service Officer
Riner, who had previously received false information from the Forest
Service park clerk that the cabin was neither registered to anyone nor
legally occupied, went to Moss's cabin to advise Moss that his car was
illegally parked and to check on Moss's safety. When Riner arrived at the
cabin, both Moss and Monroe were away from the cabin. Riner entered
the cabin without a warrant, observed Monroe's wallet, and continued to
look around the cabin in order to find more identification. During his
extended search, Riner noticed Moss's driver's license in an open pocket
in a backpack, picked up the license and found a small bag of marijuana
beneath it. He confiscated the marijuana and continued the search of the
cabin. Riner then called the park clerk to confirm whether Moss and
Monroe had in fact reserved the cabin. This time the park clerk, who
previously had failed to look in the reservations book, told Riner that
Moss had indeed reserved the cabin. Riner then waited for the campers'
return rather than searching for them. When Moss returned, Riner cited
him for simple possession under 18 U.S.C. section 844.
The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina denied Moss's motion to suppress evidence of the seized mari-
juana on the express basis that exigent circumstances existed to justify the
warrantless search and seizure. The district court convicted Moss for
possession of marijuana. The district court's ruling was problematic for
two reasons. First, the court simply stated that exigent circumstances
existed without identifying the nature of the exigency. Second, the court
relied on Rodriguez to support its ruling. However, Rodriguez was not an
exigent circumstances case; rather, it dealt with the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule.
Moss appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that Riner's search was
unconstitutional and that the district court's refusal to suppress the evi-
dence was error requiring that the convictions based upon it be vacated.
The government advanced three theories for upholding the district court's
ruling: (1) Moss had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cabin
and, therefore, no search within the contemplation of the Fourth Amend-
ment occurred; (2) a general good-faith exception to the warrant require-
ment should apply to this case in light of the false information Riner
received; and (3) the exigent circumstances exception should apply to this
case.
Before considering the government's two exception theories, the Fourth
Circuit decided that it would not address the government's first theory
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that Moss had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The court reasoned
that this theory was neither advanced by the government in the district
court nor addressed by that court in its ruling. The district court's ruling
rested exclusively on the exigent circumstances justification for what that
court implicitly found to be a "search." The Fourth Circuit relied on the
rule set forth in Singleton v. WulifP4 that, unless exceptional circumstances
exist, a federal court should not consider an issue not passed upon below.
3 "
The Fourth Circuit determined that no exceptional circumstances existed
which would justify considering the privacy expectation theory.
The Fourth Circuit next considered the government's intertwined the-
ories of good-faith exception and exigent circumstances exception. The
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that although Rodriguez involved a consen-
sual search, the Supreme Court implied that the good-faith exception
should have a wider reach in warrantless search situations than the facts
directly before the Court in Rodriguez. However, the Fourth Circuit
pointed out that Rodriguez did not extend the good-faith exception beyond
the generally recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Therefore,
in order to assert a Rodriguez good-faith exception theory, the government
must show that the mistake was related to one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
The Fourth Circuit noted that the government had not invoked any
of the commonly invoked exigencies which justify warrantless entries and
searches. The court also noted that there was no cause to believe that
Riner required immediate entry to arrest anyone inside, to protect anyone
inside from harm or to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence of
crime. The Fourth Circuit stated that other grounds for warrantless entries
and searches, such as the emergency doctrine, might also supply the basis
for applying the good-faith exception. The court defined the emergency
type of exigency as a reasonably perceived "emergency" requiring imme-
diate entry as an incident to the service and protective functions of the
police as opposed to their law enforcement functions.
In explaining the circumstances under which the emergency doctrine
could be invoked, the Fourth Circuit set forth both a test and a limitation
on the doctrine. In order to invoke the emergency doctrine, a law enforce-
ment officer making a warrantless entry must have an objectively reason-
able belief that an emergency exists that requires immediate entry to render
assistance or to prevent harm to persons or property within. In addition,
any search following a warrantless entry for emergency reasons is then
limited by the type of emergency involved; it cannot be used as the
occasion for a general voyage of discovery unrelated to the purpose of
the entry.
Using the emergency doctrine test and limitation, the Fourth Circuit
analyzed Riner's search of Moss' cabin. First, the court concluded that
343. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
344. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).
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the government failed to satisfy the emergency test because there was no
objectively reasonable basis upon which Riner could have determined that
he confronted an emergency requiring immediate entry into the cabin. In
reaching this conclusion, the court looked at Riner's stated purposes for
entering the cabin-to determine if there had been a break-in and to learn
the identity of the occupants so that he could render them assistance. In
the court's opinion, both of Riner's stated purposes were legitimate con-
cerns; however, neither purpose could be considered an emergency requir-
ing immediate entry.
Second, the Fourth Circuit determined that even if Riner's original
entry were justified under the emergency doctrine, or as the result of a
good-faith mistake in believing it so justified, his ensuing search was
unreasonable. According to the court, there was no objectively reasonable
basis upon which Riner could have believed that the accomplishment of
the stated purposes of his entry required making the search that allegedly
then disclosed the marijuana "in plain view." The court found that Riner
accomplished all imaginable purposes once he walked in the door and
found Monroe's wallet in plain view. After that point, Riner's search of
both the cabin and Moss's personal belongings was completely outside the
legitimate range of any search justified by this particular emergency
purpose.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Riner's search and seizure of the
marijuana was unconstitutional and that the evidence so seized was not
admissible under the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated Moss's conviction and remanded
with directions to suppress the evidence.
In the Moss decision, the Fourth Circuit employed the Supreme Court's
doctrine of good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in Leon
and later extended in Rodriguez to include searches which did not involve
reliance on warrants or statutes. In addition, the court decided that the
good-faith exception, which the Supreme Court extended to a consensual
search based on misinformation supplied by an external civilian source in
Rodriguez, could also be applied to a situation involving a nonconsensual
search based on misinformation supplied by an internal police source. The
Fourth Circuit might have, as a preliminary matter, distinguished the facts
in the case at bar from those in Rodriguez and therefore avoided implicitly
expanding the good-faith doctrine to a situation in which the erroneous
information was created by the negligent conduct of law enforcement
agents.145 Most importantly, in finding that the exception did not apply
345. See Ott v. Maryland, 600 A.2d 111, 116 (Md. 1992) (stating that officer's reliance on
incorrect police records precluded application of good-faith exception to exclusionary rule); cf.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 898 (1984) (noting that exclusionary rule is designed to
deter police misconduct); LAFAvE, supra note 323, § 3.5(d) (stating that police may not rely
upon incorrect or incomplete information when they are at fault in permitting records to remain
uncorrected). But see United States v. De Leon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
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in this case, the Fourth Circuit effectively narrowed the scope of this
potentially broad doctrine and set a standard for future applications of
this exception. In this respect, the Fourth Circuit is in accord with several
of the other circuits.
346
The Rodriguez decision was decided in the wake of several Supreme
Court criminal procedure cases that arguably expanded the discretion of
the government at the expense of individual liberties.3 47 This trend prompted
some commentators to observe a troubling direction for the Supreme
Court 348 and to speculate that both Fourth Amendment rights and exclu-
sionary rule trial rights were not receiving an adequate level of protection
in the Supreme Court. 349 Other commentators observed that Rodriguez
was indicative of how the Fourth Amendment has become "caught in the
crossfire of the 'war on drugs'," pointing out that some law enforcement
agencies have recognized the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
as a "strong new weapon in the war on crime. ' 350 The Moss opinion
indicates the impact that Rodriguez is currently having in the federal
that neither reliance on incorrect police license report information nor negligent failure to comply
with license number transmission policy precluded application of good-faith exception to exclu-
sionary rule).
346. See, e.g., United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163, 166 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that scope
of warrantless search and seizure is limited by its underlying justification or exception to warrant
requirement); United States v. Halliman, 923 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that valid,
emergency entry into room did not authorize search of remainder of room); United States v.
Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that entry made under exigent circumstances
must be limited in scope to minimum intrusion necessary to prevent destruction of evidence);
United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same).
347. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990) (allowing warrantless seizure
of "plain view" evidence even if discovery of evidence was not inadvertent); Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (holding that while executing arrest warrant, police officers may execute
warrantless protective sweep of entire house on reasonable suspicion of danger); Maryland v.
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1987) (holding that factual mistakes about premises, in drawing
up or executing warrant, will not invalidate warrant or search); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367, 369-72 (1987) (holding that evidence obtained during inventory search of impounded
automobile may be used as basis of prosecution).
348. See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101 YALm L.J. 551 (1991) (noting that criminal procedure cases that expand
discretion of police at expense of individual liberties represent troubling direction for Supreme
Court); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928-29 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I
have witnessed the [Supreme] Court's gradual but determined strangulation of the [exclusionary]
rule"); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (expressing
concern that Supreme Court's decision may lead to admissibility of evidence secured by official
lawlessness and to abandonment of exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases).
349. See Tammy Campbell, Note, Illinois v. Rodriguez: Should Apparent Authority Validate
Third-Party Consent Searches?, 63 U. CoLo. L. Rsv. 481 (1992) (observing that Fourth Amend-
ment rights are more easily overcome than other constitutional rights and that Rodriguez
reasonable belief standard cannot protect Fourth Amendment rights).
350. See John Wesley Hall, Jr., Privacy: Drug War Casualty, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17, 1992,
at 19 (discussing adverse effects of Leon and Rodriguez on individual liberties and observing
that some law enforcement agencies have hailed good-faith exception as strong new weapon in
war on crime).
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courts. Both the good-faith exception and the exigent circumstances ex-
ception to the warrant requirement and the exclusionary rule are flexible
doctrines that can be applied in various situations. However, the Fourth
Circuit in Moss suggests that these exceptions should be very narrowly
tailored.
Thomas v. Whalen
962 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1992)
Title 18, section 3568 of the United States Code directs that the
sentence of a federal convict does not begin until he is received at the
facility where the sentence is to be served. 351 For defendants who are
convicted of unrelated state and federal offenses and who serve the state
sentence first, federal courts generally have interpreted section 3568 to
mean that the federal sentence must run consecutively to rather than
concurrently with the state sentence.3 52 In United States v. Croft,"3 how-
ever, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
a defendant delivered to a state prison, rather than the federal penitentiary
as directed in the commitment order, is entitled to credit on his federal
sentence for the time he spent in state prison. 5 4 The Croft court based
its departure from the usual interpretation of section 3568 in large part
on the state court's order that the defendant serve his state sentence
concurrently with the federal sentence.355 The language of the federal
commitment order in Croft, which apparently directed the federal marshal
351. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 212(a)(2), 235(a)(1), 98
Stat. 1987, 2001, 2031 (1984), reenacted in part, 18 U.S.C. § 3585 (1988), states:
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence
to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary, reformatory,
or jail for service of such sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such person
credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with
the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed....
If any such person shall be committed to a jail or other place of detention to await
transportation to the place at which his sentence is to be served, his sentence shall
commence to run from the date on which he is received at such jail or other place of
detention.
No sentence shall prescribe any other method of computing the term.
Although Congress repealed § 3568, it still applies to offenses committed before November 1,
1987. See Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that federal inmate
was not entitled to credit against his sentence for time spent in drug rehabilitation prior to
entering federal penitentiary).
352. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 112 S. Ct. 1351, 1357 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
United States v. Garcia-Gutierrez, 835 F.2d 585, 586 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Segal, 549
F.2d 1293, 1301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977); Casebeer v. United States, 531
F.2d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Williams, 487 F.2d 215, 215 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 942 (1974).
353. 450 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1971).
354. United States v. Croft, 450 F.2d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 1971).
355. Id. at 1096.
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to deliver the defendant to federal prison "immediately," also influenced
the Sixth Circuit's decision.
5 6
In Thomas v. Whalen,35 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit questioned the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of section 3568
in Croft.358 .In Thomas, the petitioner, Lewis Thomas, was convicted of
two federal offenses and one unrelated Pennsylvania offense within a one
year period. The federal district court had released Thomas on bond after
his arrest on bank robbery charges; subsequently, Pennsylvania law en-
forcement officials arrested him for unrelated weapons and assault charges
and held him without bond. The state released Thomas from confinement
for the federal trials and sentencing hearings, which occurred before the
state trial. After each trial and hearing, federal officials returned Thomas
to Pennsylvania authorities. Following his state conviction, the Pennsyl-
vania court sentenced Thomas to serve thirteen to twenty-six years in the
state penitentiary. After he completed sixteen years of that sentence, federal
marshals took Thomas into custody to begin his federal sentence. While
confined at the federal penitentiary in Petersburg, Virginia, Thomas sought
to credit his time in state prison toward his federal sentence. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted Thomas's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered that he be credited for
the time served in the state penitentiary in Pennsylvania. The district court
based its decision on the precedent in Croft. The Court stayed its order
pending appeal by the Government.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, refusing to give Thomas credit
on his federal sentence for the time he served in Pennsylvania for the
unrelated state offense. In distinguishing Croft, the Thomas court first
focused on the factual differences between the two cases. The Court noted
that, unlike Croft, neither the state nor the federal courts had ordered or
anticipated concurrent state and federal sentences for Thomas. The Court
rejected Thomas's argument that Pennsylvania state law favored concur-
rent sentencing. Instead the Court reasoned that when different sovereigns
impose sentences, a court cannot presume that the sentences run concur-
rently. The Fourth Circuit also noted that primary jurisdiction in Croft
rested with the federal court, while the Pennsylvania state court had
primary jurisdiction over Thomas.
The Thomas court considered the language of the respective commit-
ment orders as the final and most important factual difference between
the two cases. In Thomas, the order did not require the federal marshals
to deliver the defendant to federal prison "immediately," as had the order
in Croft. Because the Sixth Circuit had placed such emphasis on the
immediacy of the commitment order, the Fourth Circuit was able to
distinguish Croft. The Thomas court instead followed the example of
356. Id. at 1099.
357. 962 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1992).
358. Thomas v. Whalen, 962 F.2d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 1992).
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Larios v. Madigan.359 In that case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit interpreted a commitment order with language very
similar to that in Thomas as postponing the commencement of the defen-
dant's federal sentence until state officials released him and physically
delivered him to federal authorities.
In addition to distinguishing the facts in Croft, the Thomas court
questioned the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of section 3568. It felt that
statute gave federal courts clear instructions for determining the com-
mencement of sentences. Having found the statute unambiguous, the
Thomas court criticized the Sixth Circuit (and the district court in Thomas)
for its equitable departure from Congress's instruction. The majority
opinion in Thomas concluded by holding that under the language of
section 3568, Thomas's federal sentence did not commence until federal
authorities took him into custody at the completion of his state sentence.
Judge Hall's concurring opinion in Thomas argued that while Penn-
sylvania state law and federal law dictated consecutive sentences in this
case, other situations might allow for concurrent sentencing. Arguing that
Section 3568 was more flexible than as interpreted by the majority, Judge
Hall explained that a federal court could give credit for a state sentence
made expressly concurrent. Because the state court gave no such order in
Thomas's case, the concurring opinion interpreted Pennsylvania state law
as requiring consecutive sentences.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Thomas v. Whalen is consistent with
the weight of authority interpreting 18 U.S.C. section 3568.160 Its strong
criticism of the legal reasoning in United States v. Croft further weakens
the value of that twenty year old case. 61 Thomas reinforces the interpre-
tation of section 3568 that federal and state sentences will be consecutive
unless the state court specifically orders concurrent sentencing for a
defendant already convicted and sentenced for a federal offense committed
before November 1, 1987. As a result, attorneys in the Fourth Circuit's
jurisdiction who have clients convicted of unrelated state and federal
offenses and who are unsuccessful in requesting concurrent sentences
should ensure that those clients serve the federal sentence first. For a
client currently serving his state sentence first, Thomas suggests that
petitioning the court for a writ of mandamus to order delivery to a federal
facility is the appropriate tactic.
359. 299 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962).
360. See supra note 341 (listing cases that hold 18 U.S.C. § 3568 to require consecutive
federal and state sentences for unrelated offenses).
361. See United States v. Blankenship, 733 F.2d 433, 434 (6th Cir. 1984) (construing 18
U.S.C. § 3568 to allow credit on federal sentence for prisoner's time in state custody only when
federal detainer is exclusive reason for prisoner's failure to obtain release on bail); Vaughn v.
United States, 548 F.2d 631, 633 (6th Cir. 1977) (limiting Croft to circumstance in which state
court explicitly orders its sentence to run concurrently with federal sentence).
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